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BRIEFER CONTRIBUTIONS
FUNCTIONS OF JUDGE AND COUNSEL IN THE
EXAMINATION OF JURORS
CHARLES T.

When Alphonse Capone, overlord of criminal gangdom, recently
went to trial for defrauding the
United States of income taxes, the
eyes of the nation were centered
upon a Federal court-room in Chicago. The wide notoriety of the
defendant's long and prosperous
career, and seeming immunity from
state interference, made it inevitable that the Federal trial would be
closely watched and constantly compared with the image of what would
have occurred had he been on his
trial in a state court.
One contrast was apparent at the
outset and widely commented upon
in the press. This was in regard
to the manner of selecting the jury.
The astonishing thing was that the
judge, and not the lawyers, assumed responsibility for ascertaining whether the persons summoned
for jury-service were qualified.
Judge Wilkerson asked the few and
simple questions which would disclose the fair or prejudiced attitudes of the venire-men, in a manner which assumed that they would
be entirely open and frank in expressing them. He accepted from
counsel suggestions as to additional
questions, but all actual questioning
was done by the court. In a few
hours, and in an atmosphere of
quiet decorum, twelve men were
selected to try the defendant.
'Professor of Law in Northwestern
University.
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Had Capone been on trial in a
typical state court, how would this
matter have been handled? The
judge would first have examined
the whole panel of jurors as to their
statutory qualifications, such as residence within the county, the facts
as to kinship with the parties, and
as to prejudice or fixed opinion
about the case. Those disqualified
would be excused. Then each member of the panel would be examined
and cross-examined by counsel on
each side to determine whether
either side might desire to challenge him peremptorily. This examination would in a serious case
be as searching as the indulgence
of the court would permit, into the
life-history of each individual juror,
his friendships and affiliations, and
his feelings and predilections toward crime and punishment.
Without mentioning the more extravagant of such inquiries of lawyers to jurors which are the stockin-trade of many trial court-rooms,
a few of the more restrained queries
which have been approved in recent
2
decisions will give a sampling.
What church do you belong to?
What other organization ?3 Do you
know the defendant, the witnesses,
the lawyers? If the court should
2See State v. Miller (Mo.) 207 S. W.
797 (1918) and numerous cases cited
under title "Jury" sec. 131, Decennial
and Current Digests.
3Young v. State, 41 Okl. Cr. 226, 271
P. 426 (1928).
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charge you that so-and-so is the
law would you recognize and follow this? If it appears that defendant has been convicted of other
offenses would you regard this as
evidence against him? Would you
disregard evidence given by a witness of unsavory reputation ?'
Would you convict because the
other jurors believed the defendant
guilty? Because you desired to go
home? Do you believe (in a murder case) in the law of self-defense and of excusable homicide? 6
And so on to the limit of the ingenuity of counsel.
An instance is cited of "the trial
of a labor-union slugger, where the
selection of a jury consumed nine
and a half weeks, involved the summoning of ten thousand veniremen,
the examination of nearly five thousand talesmen, and entailed a cost
to the state of forty or fifty thousand dollars."7
Such exuberance
would hardly be conceivable in these
piping times, but even within the
last decade in Illinois there have occurred some glaring examples. of
riotous waste of time. The following was written in 1926. "The
Sweet-Highten case was begun December 1, and the verdict was received on Christmas eve of last
year. More than two weeks were
required to empanel the jury. The
Lincoln case required as much time.
In the Stokes case in Chicago (not
a homicide case) more than three
weeks were required to empanel the
4People v. Ranney (Calif. App.) 293
P. 887 (1930).
5
Turner v. State, 171 Ark. 1118, 287
S. W. 400 (1926).
6People v. Bennett, 79 Calif App. 76,
249 P. 20 (1926).
7
Willoughby "Principles of Judicial
Administration" (1929) p. 510.

jury; and a like time was required
in the Shepherd case." 8
Why this elaborate and exhausting inquisition into the lives and
minds of men who after all are not
on trial but are merely summoned
to give their time disinterestedly in
the service of justice? From the
point of view of the lawyer intent
only on victory for his side, the
questioning is by no means idle. In
view of the wide powers of peremptory challenge of jurors, this inquisition will become a competitive
process of sifting the panel down
to a final twelve, with victory to
him whose counsel winnows most
expertly. Since it is hard to find
persons whose views lean against
the prosecution, an attempt at
"evening up" is usually made by
giving the defense two or three
times as many peremptory challenges as the number allotted to the
state.
An Oregon trial judge voiced the
opinion of many trial lawyers when
he said: "It seems to me that the
adoption of this rule [limiting examination of jurors by counsel] in
its practical application is going to
substantially destroy the right of
peremptory challenge. Theoretically
it will not, but practically every -experienced trial lawyer realizes that
that is what is going to happen.
The value of an examination lies
in the expression of the man's face,
the hesitating or prompt manner of
his answer, his shifty or firm
glance of the eye-a number of personal eccentricities that all come to
the surface with a close, rapid,
searching examination which cannot be given by the judge, because
the juror then takes it easily and
8
Reid "English Criminal Trials of
Today," 10 Marquette L. Rev. 27, 32
(1925).
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either doesn't make any answer or
forgets, quite often sincerely forgets."9
Again, the emphasis which the
trial lawyer, who is accustomed to
this practice, comes to place upon
the supposedly incidental matter of
selecting the jury, is reflected in
this candid passage from an address by a skilled and experienced
advocate: "And it has come to be
well recognized generally that a
litigant may get the best legal service obtainable; he may have, to
many right thinking minds, the preponderance of testimony and right;
but if his lawyer 'can't pick a jury'
his chances for success in that court
are very slim. In this paragraph I
have stated the proposition mildly.
We all know and recognize the difficulties present always, on one side
or the other, in selecting twelve
fair-minded, impartial and competent men to try almost any case,
and certainly any case of moment
or of considerable public interest.
The popularity of one or the other
of the parties, the personal influence of the lawyer, the vocation of
the plaintiff or the defendant, the
age, the sex, the political or religious affiliation or activity of
either or both parties. Opulence or
poverty, business, fraternal or social connections-does either party
trade with one of the jurors, or
vice-versa-is a juror client to one
of the lawyers, or does one of the
attorneys hold a mortgage on one
of the jurors? Who is kin to who,
and what are a juror's environments? One or more of these and
like inquiries and influences operate
to a more or less extent in the trial
of every jury case, and ofttimes determine the merits of the cadse.

Does the lawyer of the litigant go
fishing or hunting with one or more
of the jurors--do they play dominoes or poker or golf together?
Whom does he work for? Is he
'dry' or 'wet'?-An hundred associations or influences of such nature
tend to give one side or the other
an advantage even in civil cases,
and in criminal cases it is just impossible to appraise the value of
Prejudice, posthese equations.
sibly, has more to do in determining
the mind and verdict of a juror than
anything else-unless it be self-interest, and this, of course, is a
species of prejudice-like passion
or envy or jealousy." 10
In many states counsel in their
inquisition are permitted to go to
the length of rehearsing to each
prospective juror the states of fact
which in the trial they hope to
establish, and then the instructions
on the law which they hope that the
court will give, and by way of pretext for this, inquiring of each
juror whether he would have any
difficulty or unwillingness in accepting and applying such "law" and
"facts." As this is customarily done
in the presence of the whole panel,
the repetition with adroit variations
of counsel's version of the crime or
defense may often make a deep unconscious impression in the negative
minds of the jurors finally remaining after the completion of the
screening process. Those who give
signs of any intelligent independent
consideration of the questions asked
will readily be rejected. Moreover,
it gives additional time and opportunity for the counsel whose personality is the more forceful or
winning to weave his spell about
the jury.

9
Report, Judicial Council, 4 Ore. L.
Rev. 263, 270 (1925).

1Orion. T. D. Samford (1928) Proceedings, Ala. St. Bar Asso. 143-4.
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What effect does this sort of ir- lawyer for the judge to assume any
responsible and extended inquisition active and masterful role before the
have upon the minds of the jury- jury as it would be to a boxer for
men finally chosen to try the case?
the referee to make himself the
Probably it will outrage and irri- most conspicuous figure in the ring.
tate many of the veniremen and
The trial lawyer has, both in his
forever disgust them with the proc- own mind and to a large degree in
esses of justice. They will be elim- the minds of the press and the pubinated.
Those who remain will lic, been able to associate the classnecessarily be imbued with the im- interested demand for a weakening
pression that the trial is to be a of control of the trial by the judge,
proceeding where the personal with the democratic ideal. Corwhims and prejudices of the jurors respondingly he has been able to
will properly play a large part in
fasten the stigma of autocracy upon
the result.
They are psychologithe opposing demand for such precally tested, picked, and prepared for dominance by the judge as will
the highest degree of receptivity to safe-guard justice and respect for
emotional appeal. It is difficult to law. This transference has been
conceive a more effective method to made easier by the accompanying
enable the tribunal to "divorce old weakening of the personnel of the
barren Reason" from the trial.
bench by making judges elective for
Though this is in some respects short terms. Seemingly this pera minor stage in the trial,"' it has version of the democratic dogma has
real significance as a phase of the never prevailed in the other counepic and unconscious conflict be- tries which have inherited the Engtween the ideal of a trial managed lish legal tradition. Canada, Ausby a judge as its central figure and tralia, New Zealand, though in some
the widely prevalent, but never respects more responsive in governopenly avowed, conception of a ment to popular control than we
trial as a contest in a squared circle are, and in some respects much more
"radical" in sentiment, retain the
between trial lawyers where (within
due bounds of decency) superior judge as a life-time functionary with
skill, luck, personality and learning all his traditional pre-eminence at
should be free to prevail. It is as the trial, as the personal symbol of
distasteful to a certain type of trial- law and justice.
Surely no more critical test of
12Except as bearing upon the re- supremacy between judge and advospective roles of judge and counsel, cate could be presented than the
the examination of prospective jurors
in court is of less intrinsic importance question of the judge's privilege to
than the administrative procedure for conduct the examination into the
the original selection of the jurymen qualifications of the sworn and paid
to be summoned. The quality of the officers of the court who are to form
stream must be chiefly protected at its a part of the tribunal over
which
source. An illuminating description
of the defects to which a system of the judge presides. It is noteworthy
summoning jurors from a metropolitan that most of the proposals for the
area may be subject, appears in Crim- establishment of the dignified pracinal Justice in Cleveland (1922) ch. tice of examination by the judges
XI. Cf. Bruce "Summary, Illinois
Crime Survey" 19 J. Am. Inst. Cr. L. come from the judges themselves.
In the Federal courts the Conferand Cr. Appendix, 31 (1929); Missouri Crime Survey, 178-180 (19265.
ence of Senior Circuit judges rec-
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ommended the practice to the trial
judges in 1923,12 and it has been
generally adopted in those courts."
A few state courts seem to have
preserved this as a traditional practice. 14 In the other states, judicial
efforts to assume responsibility for
ascertaining the qualifications of
prospective jurors have been quickly
resented by trial lawyers. In Oregon, such a proposal by Circuit
Judge Tucker before the Judicial
Council met with hot opposition.
A representative of the bar said:
"Personally I would prefer to select
my own jury, and we do that from
the mental attitude that is exhibited
by the jury in response to the questions, and something that the attorney cannot get when the judge
asks the same question. We have
discussed this question very thoroughly in our local Bar meetings
12The Federal Judicial Council, 2
Tex. L. Rev. 458, 461 (1924).
"aThe Supreme Court has recognized
the practice approvingly, but has on
occasion, reversed the trial judge for
abuse of discretion in declining to examine the jurors upon some essential
matter when requested by counsel. Aldridgqe v. U. S. 51 S. Ct. 470 (1931).
(Refusal to inquire as to racial prejudice of jurors in the District of
Columbia, where defendant, a negro
was charged with killing a white
man.)
14 1n Alabama, California, Idaho,
South Carolina, Utah, and perhaps
some other states, by custom or statute
the trial judge seems to conduct the
examination of the jurors, with some
discretionary latitude in permitting
supplemental examination by counsel.
In most of the other states, by law
or custom, the counsel seem to be permitted a wide range of examination as
a basis for peremptory challenge. No
attempt has been made to investigate
in detail the statutes and decisions of
the particular states. See Digests cited,
n. 1 supra; statutes cited, Am. Law
Inst. Code Cr. Pro. Tentative Draft,
No. 2 (1929) pp. 265-271; Comment,
18 Calif. L. Rev. 70 (1929).

down there and out of the thirtyfour members of our local Bar one
member thought that it might be a
good rule and thirty-three of us
were opposed to it, and I believe
that that is a fair proportion of the
attorneys throughout the state outside of Portland."'1
Other judges
present took the part of the lawyers
and seemingly the proposal was
lost. In Mississippi in 1920 the
legislature authorized the judges of
the trial courts to adopt rules of
procedure. The judges promptly declared, by rule, that the function of
conducting the examination of
jurors was theirs, not the lawyers. 1
At the next meeting of the legislature, however, in 1922, the trial lawyers in that body, who naturally are
readily able in such assemblies to
secure the passage of any technical
professional measure which they desire, procured the enactment of a
law explicitly restoring to the
lawyers "the right to question
jurors" and providing that "it shall
not be necessary to propound the
questions through the presiding
judge."17 A trump card was still
available to the judges in the contest to preserve the integrity of the
process of selecting the personnel
of the tribunal. One of the circuit
judges was courageous enough to
play this card. He refused to follow
the statute in a criminal case, and
overruled the defense attorney's
154 Ore. L. Rev. 269 (1925).
'The rule, as set out in the argument of counsel in Funches v. Stale
125 Miss. 140, 145, 87 So. 487 (1921),
was as follows: "Rule 10. In all
cases the court alone shall examine
jurors touching their qualification, and
should the juror then appear to be
qualified, the court will ask any additional proper questions suggested by
counsel."
27C.

294, Laws of 1922; 1 Miss. Code

(1930) Art 2068.
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request for permission to question
the jurors on the ground that "the
statute relied upon is unconstitutional and one which the legislature
of the State of Mississippi was
powerless to enact, as it seeks to
take the inherent power of the circuit court away and place the running of the courts in the hands of
the legislature." One may imagine
the indignation which must have
swept the ranks of trial lawyers in
the state. The Supreme Court was
naturally more influenced by prevailing professional opinion than by
any feeling of responsibility for
safeguarding the dignity and decorum of administering justice in
trial courts. Its surrender of control to the legislature of trial administration had already gone to
the extreme lengths of permitting
the legislature to deprive the trial
judge completely of the power to
instruct the jury at all upon the
law, except and until requested to
do so by the attorneys !18 Naturally,
it reversed the courageous trial
judge and instructed him to relinquish the function of examining
the jury to the lawyers.10
This contest is surging on many
fronts, of which the struggle for
control over the selection of the
'SBangs v. State 61 Miss. 363 (1883).
lglones v. State 133 Miss. 684, 98
So. 150 (1923). In Louisiana, the Supreme Court, though no specific statute
stood in the way, condemned as an
innovation, a rule adopted in the trial
court, reserving to the judge the examination of jurors. State v. Guidry
160 La. 655, 107 So. 479 (1926).
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jury is a minor skirmish, but significant because the lines of opposing forces are already visible. In
the Federal Courts, the custom of
selection of judges from the higher
strata of the bar, 20 the judges' independent tenure, and the frequent
contacts and association of judges
from different districts and circuits,
have contributed to the up-building
of a strong judicial esprit de corps.
judicial conferences and councils,
meetings of judicial sections in Bar
Associations, quickening relations
between judges and law schools, and
the emerging demands of a small
but influential element of the bar
who are more deeply interested in
the law as an agency of public justice than as a source of private advantage, may within the next few
decades strengthen the professional
group-consciousness of our state
judges. When this time comes, professional pride will nerve them to
assume control of the court-room.
The trial lawyers will then take
their rightful place as ministers of
the court in marshalling facts and
legal doctrines, and will cede to the
judge the power to meet his responsibility for the dignity, dispatch
and impartiality of the trial.
20Even this custom is threatened by
danger of political coercion exercised
upon the President by the Senate.
Sears "Appointment of Federal District Judges" 25 I11. L. Rev. 54 (1930),
Shartel "Federal judges - Appointment, Supervision, and RemovalSome Possibilities under the Constitution" 28 Mich. L. Rev. 485, 486-488
(1930)

